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Distributive Justice as a Means to Address Local Conflicts in European Law and Policy
Fernanda G Nicola*

Abstract
The impact of European Union (EU) law and policy on social groups has been examined
in important scholarly work on European Law.1 Mainstream European legal scholarship,
however, makes seldom use of a ‘law and society’ methodology, committed to an understanding
of law, its internal logic and its practice yet influenced by external political and social forces.2 By
means of two different theoretical perspectives, American legal realism and Amartya Sen’s idea
of comparative justice, this chapter focuses on the impact of European decision-making on social
groups and local actors embracing different conceptions of justice from below.3 Lawyers, judges
and policy-makers in the EU appear more concerned with institutional demands of justice rather
its social realization as revealed by local actors with conflicting visions of justice. The chapter
uses distributive justice as a means to reconcile such different visions of the good life.

* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, BA and JD Turin University, PhD Trento University, SJD Harvard
Law School, I am indebted to Dimitry Kochenov, Brishen Rogers, Daniela Caruso, Cathy Mc Cauliff, Gianluigi
Palombella and Lucia Scaffardi for their comments on this chapter. Forthcoming in EUROPE’S JUSTICE DEFICIT,
DIMITRY KOCHENOV, GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA AND ANDREW WILLIAMS EDS. (2014).
1
See LAWYERING EUROPE: EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD (ANTOINE VAUCHEZ AND BRUNO
DE WITTE EDS. 2013); KENNETH ARMSTRONG, GOVERNING SOCIAL INCLUSION: EUROPEANIZATION THROUGH
POLICY COORDINATION (2010); Antonia Layard, Freedom of Expression and Spatial (Imagination of) Justice, in
EUROPE’S JUSTICE DEFICIT, DIMITRY KOCHENOV, GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA AND ANDREW WILLIAMS EDS. (using legal
geography as a tool to show how law, space and geography are mutually constituted and reflective).
2

See David S. Clark, History of Comparative Law and Society, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 1-36 (David S.
Clark ed., 2012). Even though the law and society methodology was prevalent in Europe during the early twentieth
century, this methodology remains more predominant in the US legal academia rather than in EU law.
3
See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
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Introduction
Even though EU law is not supposed to intervene in domestic disputes arising solely
within a Member State without implicating EU norms directly,4 European judge-made law
inevitably redistributes power and resources among private and public actors inside national
jurisdictions.5 The disconnect between the declared duality of EU law and its inexistence due to
an overreaching European judge-made law has been central to the work of several authors.6 In
addressing such disconnect, this chapter takes a distinctive local or municipal perspective. The
‘from below’ point of departure shows how EU law redistributes power to local actors, groups,
and cities with multiple and conflicting conceptions of justice.
Rather than romanticising cities and regions for their communal territorial ties,7 or praise
them as urban innovators to rescue struggling markets,8 local actors depending on the territorial
and jurisdictional context have different preferences that are shaped by and in turn shape EU law.
In particular, EU law destabilizes traditional and internal distribution of powers by creating
unstable multilevel governance alliances with conflicting political goals and different
conceptions of justice. This chapter argues that such unstable political local alliances driven by
the different conceptions of justice from below rarely surface in European decision-making. For
instance, in applying general principles of uniformity and proportionality in its interpretation, the
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) does not openly address conflicting notions of justice from

4

See Miguel Poiares Maduro, The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and
Reverse Discrimination, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN REMEDIES 117 (C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P.
Skidmore eds., 2000) and for critical views see Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly
Internal Rule: Time to Move On? 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 731 (2002) and D. Kochenov and R. Plender, EU
Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text, 37 E.L. REV 369,
383 (2012).
5
See Fernanda G. Nicola, Invisible Cities in Europe, 35 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 1282 (2012).
6
See Allott, Philip, The European Community is Not the True European Community, Yale LJ (100) 2485; Gareth
Davies, Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralis (Eric Stein Working Paper No. 1/2010,
2010)
7
See Richard Thompson Ford, Bourgeois Communities: A Review of Gerald Frug's "City Making," 56 STAN. L.
REV. 231 (2003).
8
See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011).
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below that arise in European adjudication.9 The local and municipal viewpoint often disappears
in the CJEU deliberations in which subnational actors have limited standing10 or their viewpoint
is collapsed into the one of their Member States.11
A first theoretical insight relies on the influence of American legal realism12 in departing
from an understanding of the federal judiciary as a neutral arbiter determining the competences
between States and the Federal government as two absolute powers within their spheres.13
Instead of acting as a neutral umpire, the federal judiciary enables the trade-off of powers and
resources between various actors at the federal, state and local level according to the Court’s
political goals.14 Likewise, in the EU scenario the European judiciary enables unstable multilevel
alliances which create trade-offs of power and resources vertically, among various supranational
and national actors, but also horizontally, and most importantly among various domestic actors.15
Local jurisdictions in Europe are not neutral actors, nor “creatures of the states,” but rather
places that acquire or lose power in constant negotiation with each other and with their central

9

See Stavros Tsakyrakis, Disproportionate Individualism, p. 5 (explaining how the judges in the US and the EU
have mainstreamed proportionality as a give method in adjudication).
10
See Case C-95/97, Région Wallonne v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. I-1787; Case C-180/97, Regione Toscana v.
Commission, 1997 E.C.R. I-5245; see also Case T-81/97, Regione Toscana v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-2889;
Regione Siciliana v. Commission, 2006 E.C.R. I-3881; Case C-15/06 Regione Siciliana v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R.
I-02591. Several commentators have addressed this problem, Daniela Caruso, Direct Concern in Regional Policy:
The European Court of Justice and the Southern Question 16 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 2011; Joanne Scott,
Regional Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 625, 636-37 (Paul Craig & Grainne
de Búrca eds., 1992) (commenting on the lack of legal standing of individual applicants); Steven Weatherill, The
Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union, in THE ROLE OF REGIONS AND SUB-NATIONAL
ACTORS IN EUROPE (Stephen Weatherill & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2005 p. 1-32 at p.7-8) (in which Steven Weatherill
explains: “the EC pays for its regional-blindness. […] Its formal lack of regard for domestic constitutional
arrangements may be combined with activity that in practice severely disturbs those internal patterns.”)
11
Case C-137/09, Josemans v. Burgemeester van Maastricht, Judgment of the Court 2010 E.C.R. I-13019. For a
similar analysis in US law see Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059(1980) (Frug has
showed how the invisibility of cities in the US constitutional structure influenced the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
that reduced cities to either public actors as “creatures of the State” or as private actors as mere market participants).
12
See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher, et al. eds., 1995).
13
See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006).
14
See Richard Thompson Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 921 (1999);
GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008).
15
See Fernanda G. Nicola, Another View on European Integration: Distributive Stakes in the Harmonization of
European Law, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKING IDEOLOGY AND
STRATEGY 233-260 (Claire Dalton, ed., 2007).
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governments or the Union.16 In its application of the principle of proportionality, the CJEU
reconciles conflicting moral values arising in its internal market jurisprudence between the States
and the Union.17 In the Court’s deliberation, however, the ongoing horizontal conflicts and
collaborations often disappear or they are subsumed within the classic narrative of mediation of
federal versus national tensions.
A second theoretical entry point of this chapter is Amartya Sen’s idea of comparative
justice.18 In the Idea of Justice Sen both departs from and enriches the dominant theory of
distributive justice elaborated by John Rawls.19 Sen reveals the gap between people’s
opportunity to obtain primary goods and what people really enjoy because of their preferences.
His analysis begins with assessing inequalities instead of creating institutional structures
committed to the allocation of primary goods.20 This consequentialist approach to law overlaps
with the “bad man” theory elaborated by Oliver Wendell Holmes.21 In departing from abstract
legal principles Holmes focuses on the practical consequences of legal norms which range from
paying damages to imprisonment. Sen contributes with his capability approach to enrich Rawls’
theory of justice: genuine opportunities that help us value the way we live should be the basis for
the equality.22 Our individual capabilities should be the barometers for evaluating when
opportunities will allow us to achieve the desired well-being. Equality of suitable opportunities
for the person in question will ensure that societal conditions are just for the carpenter, the
musician as well as the banker.
Sen assesses the development of a community or a country characterized by territorial
and cultural heterogeneity according to the functioning of each locality and its capacity to realize
the model of development each particular community values. At times the access to valuable
functioning that communities aspire to achieve is constrained by the fact that these are located at

16

Fernanda G. Nicola, ‘Creatures of the State’: Regulatory Federalism, Local Immunities, and EU Waste
Regulation in Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter
Lindseth eds., 2011).
17
See PAULETTE KURZER, MARKETS AND MORAL REGULATION CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2001); Floris de Witte, Sex, drugs & EU law: The recognition of moral and ethical diversity in EU law, 50
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW, 6, pp. 1545–1578 (2013).
18
See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).
19
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
20
See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1995).
21
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897).
22
Amartya Sen, Development as Capability Expansion, 19 J. DEV. PLAN. 41, 43 (1989).
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the periphery rather than the core of the Union.23 Yet these communities’ limited options and
aspirations should be compared in order to assess existing inequalities in our society and
different moral conceptions of the good life.
This chapter foregrounds conflicting conceptions of justice from below emerging in
European jurisprudence that the Court fails to address through the interpretation of EU
proportionality and subsidiarity principles. These conceptions of justice from below shed light on
existing ethical differences and unresolved conflicts in order to achieve the social realization of
actors who are differently situated. Rather than tying local actors and social groups to decisions
based on abstract legal principles and institutional demands, the starting point is why injustice
arises in particular socio-economic settings. This framing of the justice/injustice question could
put European judges or policy-makers in the position to anticipate and clarify the unintended
effects of their decision-making on specific territories and social groups. More importantly, it
could provide the opportunity to European judges, lawyers and policy-makers to clarify their
normative position over conflicts reclaiming different conceptions of justice.

1. Displacing the Neutrality of the Federal Judiciary and its Federalism Doctrines
Pre-realist and formalist ideas of a neutral federal judiciary and its federalism doctrines
have played an important role in US and EU adjudication. Scholars who have rejected and
criticized such doctrines have engaged in judicial debates addressing the social tensions mediated
by federalism while mapping the shift from dual to cooperative federalism in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence.24 Such doctrinal shift in the US Supreme Court’s adjudication reflected
the political economic shift from laissez faire to new deal interventionism in the twentieth
century. A central figure in US legal realism was the economist and jurist Robert L. Hale.25 His
work on private law set aside the pre-realist idea that the free market was a natural condition that
led to predictable and efficient outcomes without state intervention. Instead Hale viewed the

23

See Damjan Kukovec, Justice at the European Periphery - The Discourse of Justice and the Reproduction of the
Status Quo. Available at (last checked March 28, 2014)
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice
2013/files/contributions/29.europeanuniversityinstituteprof_kochenov_nl_eui_justice_wp_en.pdf
24
See ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN
LAW (2009).
25
See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND
ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (2001).
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market as a regulated environment where groups of buyers and sellers constantly acquire or lose
their relative bargaining power vis–à-vis other groups and the state.26 An analogy to the free
market idea is the pre-realist notion that the federal judiciary was a neutral umpire meant to
police the clashes between independent federal and state absolute spheres of authority.27
From a legal realist perspective, federal adjudication rather than interpreting neutral
principles created a series of trade-offs among federal, state, and local powers.28 The outcome of
federal adjudication was unstable multilevel alliances over specific political and legal
outcomes.29 Therefore for legal realists neither free market policies nor federal legal doctrines
offered neutral solutions to the redistribution of resources and power according to a fair criterion
of justice.
Among European lawyers some have challenged the supposedly neutral and pre-realist
interpretation of the CJEU often driven by the need uniformity in EU law rather than by
politically driven motivations. For instance Gareth Davies has shown how the preliminary
reference procedure allows the CJEU to decide a question of “competence allocation” in a way
that undermines its status as a neutral umpire or “infantilizing” national courts.30 In a similar
vein, Daniela Caruso demonstrated that the CJEU has used neutral and technical principles in
private law adjudication to achieve the consolidation of “institutional gains” for European
integration.31 Finally, Tamara K. Hervey has called “imaginative jurisprudence” a progressive
approach aiming at rewriting the Kohll decision32 addressing one of the central social rights
preserved in the EU legal system namely the right to health care.33 Rather than using a strictly

26

See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470
(1923).
27
This conception of the federal government was the predominant one during nineteenth century Classical Legal
Thought. See Duncan Kennedy, The Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, in THE NEW LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
28
See Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid-Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 824 (1983).
29
See generally David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377 (2001).
30
See Gareth Davies, The Division of Powers Between the European Court of Justice and National Courts: A
Critical Look at Interpretation and Application in the Preliminary Reference Procedure in REGULATING THE
INTERNAL MARKET (Niamh Nic Shuibne ed., 2006).
31
See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization.39 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, 1 (2006).
32
Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, E.C.R. 1998I-1931, (1998).
33
See Tamara K Hervery, Re-judging Social Rights in the European Union, p. 345-368 at 246 in CRITICAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, EDS. DE BURCA, KILKPATRICK AND SCOTT (2014) explaining that in
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European framework, the work of all three scholars exemplifies how legal realist lenses have
crossed the Atlantic. In particular their work has become part of a global critical discourse in the
conceptualization of legal institutions, private law and socio-economic rights.34
The relevance of legal realism and critical thought bears meaning for the judicial
interpretation of American federalism. For instance, the Supreme Court has developed during the
nineteenth century the pre-realist doctrine of dual federalism conceived of state and federal
power as two separate spheres of authority. 35 This doctrine was displaced from the 1930s until
the early 1990s in favor of from the principle of plenary powers that conceives instead states as
autonomous from but nevertheless embedded in federal authority. This shift in doctrinal
interpretations is coupled by a federal judiciary initially supporting laissez-faire legislation to the
New Deal legislation committed to social policy.36 In contrast to dual federalism, American and
European scholars committed to social justice have advanced cooperative federalism as
prescriptive theory that enhances federal and state collaboration.37 The US federal judiciary has
used these doctrines at different times to achieve different political economy goals depending on
the political shifts on the bench.38 Legal elites have supported free market liberalism by
interpreting the dual sovereignty doctrine, whereas social justice scholars have used cooperative
federalism to enhance welfare reforms.
However with the 1990s, the Rehnquist court began promoting its new federalism
doctrine selectively. 39 In doing so, the Supreme Court resuscitated in part the dual sovereignty

rejecting some fundamental premises that shape EU law and policy, such as the creation of a liberal market and that
the EU is not a human rights organization, we can engage in imaginative jurisprudence by “a literal rewriting of
seminal cases through a critical lens.”.
34
See Duncan Kennedy, The Globalization of Critical Discourses on Law: Thoughts on David Trubek’s
Contribution, 3-14 in CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, EDS. DE BURCA, KILKPATRICK
AND SCOTT (2014).
35
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (providing an example of dual federalism doctrine in which the states
and the federal governments are depicted as two autonomous spheres). While some commentators have criticized
the inconsistency of the new federalism and the recurrence of federalist arguments over time others have promoted
alternative and more interactive approaches to federal power. See Philip Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001); Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005).
36
See ROBERT R SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM (2009) p.123.
37
Id., supra 36 p. 241.
38
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
39
See Richard H. Fallon, The 'Conservative' Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 429 (2002); David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377 (2001).
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doctrine even though this appeared long time abandoned.40 The new federalism doctrine of the
Rehnquist court conceived overlap between state and federal authority even though these
remained separate spheres of power. The new federalism doctrine shows that even though
scholars like Robert Schütze have declared the death of dual federalism, in light of the
predominance of cooperative federalism in both the EU and the U.S., such eulogy has remained a
normative aspiration rather than a judicial praxis to interpret federal doctrines.41 Legal realists
have warned against the false expectation that legal doctrines, despite their ideological
genealogies, might not always lead to desired normative outcomes.42
Cooperative localism, albeit different from cooperative federalism, resonates with the
federal doctrine of plenary powers developed by the Supreme Court to support the legislative
supremacy of Congress enacting New Deal legislation.43 Scholars have used the notion of
cooperative localism to highlight the beneficial interaction between federal and local
governments in the realm of federal regulatory policies. This cooperation creates pockets of local
autonomy often in tension with state-level power.44 In addition, the cooperation between local
and federal authorities at times limits state control on local decision-making which enhances
local experimentation.45 For instance, some federal spending programs that are directly allocated
to counties or municipalities have spurred opposition at the state level against local control of
federal funding. 46 The downside of such federal-local cooperation happens when it ends up

40

Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 139, 142 (2001).
41
See Erin F. Delaney, Book Review in 41 publius 349 (2011) (doi: 10.1093/publius/pjq017) reviewing ROBERT
SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
EUROPEAN LAW (2009)
42
See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935) and
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1697 (1976).
43
See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional
Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 682 (2000) (noting that, after the New Deal, "the Court desisted from enforcing the
non-delegation doctrine, thus allowing Congress broad discretion to allocate legislative power).
44
See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93
VA. L. REV. 959, 968-74 (2007) (explaining new forms of federal local cooperation in the aftermath of September
11, post hurricane Katrinaand on fiscal federalism).
45
See Susan-Rose Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983); Joshua Sarnoff,
Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 (1997); Philip
J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001).
46
See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District, 469 U.S. 256 (1985); see also Davidson, supra note
202; Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption
in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007).

8

substituting federal power to state power thus rendering local government once again creatures
of the state rather than experimenting or freely allocating funding according to their needs. 47
The realist lesson is that advocating for dual federalism, cooperative federalism or
localism per se does not produce the normatively desired results for social justice. Legal realism
has taught us that legal entitlements, namely the rules of private and public law that undergird
institutions, such as markets or federal governments, determine which parties enjoy which sorts
of viable legal claims with regard to those institutions.48 Because all institutions have bundles of
rights and entitlements, however, one often risks a categorical error by assuming that the
particular bundles will be assigned and distributed in the same way in different jurisdictions and
at different time periods.49 The outcomes of federal doctrines mediating the tensions of political
and federal conflicts involving levels of governments need to be evaluated on a case by case
analysis. In order to take political decisions that will promote distributive justice in the EU, the
CJEU will have to set aside its neutral umpire role and openly recognize its counter majoritarian
yet democratic role.50

2. Distributive Justice in Adjudication
A mainstream approach to law relies on redistribution of resources and power via tax and
transfers, rather than adjudication. According to legal economists, judges should pursue
efficiency and set aside distributive goals in adjudication because it is difficult or impossible to
redistribute through legal rules, whereas legislatures have the competence to deal with
distribution of resources.51 Legislative decisions and the government's tax and transfer systems,

47

See Fernanda Nicola, ‘Creatures of the State’: Regulatory Federalism, Local Immunities, and EU Waste
Regulation in Comparative Perspective; in “Comparative Administrative Law,” Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter
Lindseth Eds. (Elgar Publishing, 2011).
48
See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); Duncan
Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991).
49
See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710
(1917) and Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 Wis. L. Rev. 975, p. 993-994 (explaining Hohfeld’s fundamental error).
50
This position has been prominently advocated by JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) in his response to the counter-majoritarian difficulty of undemocratic judicial review
articulated by well-known constitutional theorist such as ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRACH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
51
See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEL SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 31-35 (2002).

9

are likely to be more precise than the decision of a random judge.52 Even liberal philosophers
such a John Rawls who elaborated a rational and normatively grounded theory of distributive
justice with “well-founded justifications” to eliminate arbitrary discrimination was skeptical
about relying on judges to apply it. Rawls’s difference principle and its “maximin” distributive
criterion aim to redistribute primary social goods to maximize the welfare of the least
advantaged.53 However, Rawls did not view the difference principle as guiding judicial
reasoning, instead confining it to the legislative sphere.54 According to Rawls’s difference
principle, rational and reasonable beings in the original position would not choose principles
mandating total equality among all individuals.55 Rather, they would choose principles
mandating that inequalities must be to the benefit of the worst-off—as, for example, when
inequalities “set up various incentives which succeed in eliciting more productive efforts.” 56 In
the global and possibly transitional context, however, scholars have shown the limits of the
Rawlsian approach tailored to a national situation.57
However, critical scholars have shown that redistribution can be carried out not only
through tax and transfer programs, but also through adjudication.58 Accepting that members of
the judiciary decide on what legislatures deliberate daily might undermine courts’ autonomy and
legitimacy, especially in civil law countries in which at least, at the declaratory level, judges
should be the mouth of the law.59 Even though jurists have long criticized such notion of judicial

52

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (1999).
See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 62-92.
54
See Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEX. L. REV. ___ (2014).
55
See RAWLS, supra note 13 at 151.
56
Id.at 152.
57
See generally THOMAS POOGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000). See Joseph Heath, Rawls on
Global Distributive Justice: A Defence, 31 CAN. J. PHIL. 193 (2005), available at
http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~jheath/defence-of-rawls.pdf.
58
See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, app. B at 654 (1982).
59
See JOHN HENRY MERRIMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969) citing Montesquieu’s De l'Esprit des Loix; at
pp.17-8.
53
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discretion by showing that civil law courts have wide room of interpretation of statutory texts,60
civil law court’s judicial styles still tend to conform to that narrow belief.61
In the same tradition the judges of the CJEU have been careful not to overstep their
boundaries and exercise prudently their judicial discretion. Even when they make decisions that
redistribute power and resources within the Member States, European judges tend not
acknowledge openly the costs and benefits of their decisions. The style of their decisions and the
lack of dissenting opinions obscure the distributive consequences at stake in each judgment.62
Several commentators have criticized the CJEU for its rejection to engage in comparative law by
citing or dialoguing with other courts, especially with the ECtHR, to increase the transparency of
its decision-making processes.63 However from the interpretation of European private law
directives to the application of anti-discrimination principles, European judges redistribute
resources and power according to efficiency criteria rather than a principle of distributive
justice64 Instead of empirical reality, the efficiency claim made by judges to reduce the barriers
to trade the single market bears rhetorical power to legitimate new legislative and judicial action
on behalf of the EU. 65 European judges attribute the results of their decision-making process to
the sophisticated balancing between conflicting interests in light of a proportionality criterion
which in their view entails effects on the Union, the member states but only rarely local actors,
cities, territorial groups and citizens.

60

See Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia, 10 LA. L. REV. 431 (1949).Mitchel
de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 Yale L. J. 1325
(1995).
61
See Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104
Yale L. J. 1325 (1995).
62
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: Causes and Consequences Paper
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There are counterexamples to the judicial style of the CJEU. For instance the opinion of
Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston in the Government of the French Community and Walloon
Government v. Flemish Community66 that was not followed by the Court called on to strike down
a reverse discriminatory scheme in Belgium. The French Community in Belgium challenged an
insurance scheme adopted by the Flemish government which was open only to individuals who
both lived and worked in the Flanders region of Belgium and not, for example, to those working
in Flanders but residing in the Walloon region. The CJEU decided this case by drawing the
distinction between two categories of workers: those who have exercised their freedom to move
within the EU,67 and those who have not done so who were prevented from using the insurance
scheme.68 The paradoxical outcome was that EU citizens (non-Belgians) residing in Belgium
were better protected than Walloon Belgian citizens who did not move around the Union. Thus,
EU law offered more protection than Belgian law. Rather than abandoning the wholly internal
situation doctrine, the Court adventured in a careful analysis of which groups could be protected
under EU law because of their ability to move and those who could not.
In her opinion, Advocate General Sharpston suggested a different doctrinal path and
rationale that was not followed by the CJEU. While she made the same classification of the
CJEU in distinguishing between Belgians who have exercised their right of free movement and
other EU citizens versus those Belgians who did not move, Sharpston suggested to interpret the
Treaty provisions on European citizenship more broadly than the Court eventually did. Thus
suggesting the elimination of the purely internal situation in the case, she advocated for
extending the coverage of the insurance to all Belgian citizens connected to the Flemish region.69
The rational in Sharpston’s opinion was even more significant than her doctrinal
interpretation. In mentioning that judges should be open to evaluate the territorial regulatory
schemes, she explained that a discriminatory scheme might discriminate per se or it might seek

66

Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v. Flemish Government [2008]
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to promote development in underdeveloped territories. In either case, she argued, European
judges are well-situated to understanding the conflict at stake as well as the effects of a domestic
regulatory scheme on different local and transnational communities.70 Basically Sharpston was
suggesting an evaluation of the distributive effects of the insurance care scheme creating nonmedical assistance and social services for people affected by a prolonged disability adopted by
the Flemish Community. This reasoning was more along the lines of what the Belgian
Constitutional Court had already decided in its judgment on April 2006 before referring its two
questions to the CJEU.71 In its 2006 decision the Constitutional court had found that “the
Flemish legislation did not infringe the economic and monetary unity of Belgium due to the
small amount of money involved and the limited impact of the criticized measures on the free
movement of persons in Belgium”.72
In their insightful essay, Peter Van Elsuwege and Stanislas Adam show that what should
have been a dialogue between the CJEU and the Belgian Constitutional court through the
preliminary ruling became instead a long dispute revealing different conceptions of justice as
well as institutional perspectives.73 For instance, what they call the “discongruence” between EU
and Belgian law arises over the notion of social security, the different conceptions of free
movement and the recognition of regional autonomy are based on a mix of problems arising
from institutional design as well as divergent visions about which level of government should
bear redistributive policies addressing a particular territory or community.74 The tension in this
case arises between subnational redistributive mechanisms that have become politically
uncontroversial at the national level but are now put in question by EU Law, whether directly or
via CJEU decisions. 75 However even if the Court refuses to intervene directly it may rely on the
fact that EU law background rules already constrain Member States’ action.76
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3. In Search of Distributive Justice in Cohesion Policy
The most obvious mechanisms to address the uneven distributive impact of
Europeanization was the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) that was created in the
1970s by the Community. By 1986 European regional or cohesion policies attempted to balance
socio-economic inequalities among European regions stressing in the Single European Act an
egalitarian commitment to “harmonious development by reducing the differences existing
between the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.”77
In the Lisbon Treaty EU regional or cohesion policy becomes explicitly an economic
development policy aiming at “reducing disparities between the levels of development of
the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions,”78 which clearly
implies addressing disparate levels of wealth, unemployment, and capital income across the
regions of Europe.79 In 2009 the Barca report indicated the weaknesses as well as the potential of
the current regime that was essential to complement the unification of the internal market the
single currency and the erosion of the national welfare state in order to offer “equal gains from
unification, to have equal access to the opportunities so created as well as equal possibility of
coping with risk and threats.”80 The report attempted to revamp solidarity and distributive justice
as constituent of EU cohesion policies well before the current pledges made by Jürgen
Habermas and Claus Hoffe to revamp solidarity and democracy in the aftermath of the European
financial crisis.81
Since the 1970s there have been numerous challenges that the EU has encountered in the
application of a rational criterion of distributive justice to its cohesion policy. First, the amount
of wealth that ought to be redistributed from wealthy centers to poor peripheries is clearly
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insufficient to fulfill the promises of a “regional policy reducing regional economic and social
disparities across European states and regions.”82 At a more substantial level, distributive justice
is hard to achieve when Member States are unable to agree that eliminating wealth inequalities
among their territories is a foundational commitment for all of society, and not only a benefit for
the poor. As a result many Member States have used cohesion policies as a bargaining chip to
obtain resources in return of political compromises. Finally, promoting redistribution on the basis
of cooperation among its twenty-eight member states, with partial surrender of their sovereignty
vis-à-vis the Union, will not succeed without such adherence to the requirement of a distributive
justice policy. At different times, EU cohesion policies have been used instrumentally by the
Member States as a trade-off for political and diplomatic compromises. Often EU cohesion
policies were negotiated “as a side-payment and a redistribute mechanism for budgetary
contributions” to compensate states in the context of a new enlargement.83
A more dramatic example in 2013 was the freezing by the European Commission of its
cohesion and regional funds disbursement to Hungary as a way to put pressure on a Member
State that did not respect basic democratic guarantees.84 While many commentators have
reported the “illiberal” turn in Hungary since 2010 after the constitutional changes led by the
conservative Fidesz party,85 this situation has revealed the lack of mechanisms within the Union
to address the infringement of basic democratic and rule of law commitments by the Member
States.86 Due to such lack, cohesion policies have become the more ready available political tool
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used as a short time and not satisfactory remedy attempting to force Member States to change
their behavior.87
In these examples the notion of territorial cohesion remains a vague concept that is not
anchored to a distributive justice principle. Such vagueness has allowed for more or less noble
reasons the Member States and the European Commission to use cohesion policies, for lack of
better tool, as a tool to address European crises in ways that had very little to do with territorial
cohesion. Cohesion and regional policies have become a stunning example of how the
deliberative forum to express local interests and create more stable multilevel alliances has been
taken over by either Member States or EU overriding goals.88 Despite the prominent debate over
the renationalization thesis and its critiques led by political scientists,89 the missing focus has
been the lack of a distributive justice commitment in cohesion policies.
4. The Idea of Justice as a Comparative Development Framework
Amartya Sen’s Idea of Justice introduces a pragmatic theory of justice that departs from
Rawls’ foundationalism about institutional structures and their relation to justice. Sen starts from
the ground up, thinking about the realization of justice rather than its definition as an abstract
principle.90 His theory addresses everyday inequalities while also ambitiously providing both a
rational and universal theory of justice. Instead of an ideal theory committed to long-term and
extensive institutional reforms, transcendental institutionalism, Sen engages with an impartial
method of reasoning to assess the comparative justice of alternative states of affairs called
realization-focus comparison emerging from the Enlightenment tradition.91 Transcendental
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institutionalism has spurred fundamental work on just institutions with underlying ethical
imperatives. In contrast the realization-focus comparison is concerned with social realizations
inspired by comparative approaches to justice.92 The idea at the heart of the approach that Sen
pursues in his work is that competing reasons for justice can coexist and should be better
understood by assessing social inequalities.
Sen’s approach resonates with the work of those comparative lawyers engaging with
positive-sociology functionalism to understand legal change in the context and the territory in
which legislation is likely to be implemented, reformed or transplanted.93 Comparative scholars
engaged in legal reform, however, often fail to confront the “gap” between legal and social
practice.94 Important scholarly work shows how unintended consequences of legal reform and
the problem with a one-size fit all approach to law end up undermining, rather than consolidating
legal reforms.95
In addressing the question on how to promote legal change to spur economic
development, David Trubek and Mark Galanter realized after an intense law reform activity that
they achieved less than they hoped, this was, in itself, a significant realization.96 In their famous
‘self-estrangement’ article, Trubek and Galanter show a number of misleading liberal legalist
assumptions that heavily constrained the agenda of legal reformers.97 The gap between the social
and legal context was clearly a recipe for failure when attempting to reform a legal regime
embedded in socio-economic realities different from those in the United States. Thus a
cautionary note is warranted when applying principles of liberal law reform in rapidly changing
societies like the EU.
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The liberal legalist assumptions bear a lot of resemblances with the “economic
technology” within EU post-national regimes promoting economic development and growth
while heightening wealth disparities and sovereign debt crisis in some of its poorest regions.98
Furthermore, the EU remains characterized by profound differences among Member States with
diverse economic, political and social stability. Many have recent histories of dictatorships with
experiences akin to colonialism not so different from the developing world’s experience. Thus
the challenge for a European idea of justice is to resist the notion that the EU Member States are
territorially homogenous, in full respect of the rule of law and they are free from poverty,
corruption and informal norms.

5. Three Children, a Flute and the CJEU Jurisprudence
Sen’s theory is very much in tune with the notion that justice should be understood
according to the types of human lives that people can actually live and the capabilities they
have.99 The famous story that Sen uses to illustrate his theory is the one of the three children and
flute in which each child has a competing and compelling reason to claim that flute.100
In Sen’s example, Anne claims the flute for herself because she is the only one among the
three children who can play the flute. Bob also claims the flute because he is the poorest and he
does not own any toys. Finally, Carla claims the flute for herself because the existence of the
flute is a result of her work and her devotion and commitment to making it. Each child represents
a starting point for our conceptions of justice in which Anne makes a utilitarian argument, Bob
an egalitarian and Carla a libertarian one. Each argument is based on an “impartial and nonarbitrary reason.”101 Each one of them needs serious consideration because there is no “perfectly
just social arrangement” that will allow each of them to achieve what he wants and consequently
agree with one solution.
This part uses as an analogy the flute story to explore the different conceptions of justice
from below emerging in a judicial deliberation of the CJEU. The distributive effects of the

98

See Michelle Everson, The Fault of (European) Law in (Political and Social) Economic Crisis, Law and Critique,
Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp 107-129 (2013).
99
See SEN, supra note 8, at18.
100
See id. at 12-15.
101
See id. at 13.

18

Court’s decisions, siding with one rather than another conception of justice, are likely to impact
unevenly the economic and social development of a specific territory.
The Rüffert judgment is an excellent example of conflicting conceptions of justice from
below that continues the saga of the Laval judgment interpreting the Posted Workers directive
96/71 that regulates the free movement of workers posted for a limited period of time in another
Member State.102 Even though the directive was drafted with the aim of protecting workers
against social dumping, especially in the construction industry, its interpretation in Laval has
created an opposite outcome with the influx of former Eastern European workers into Western
Europe.103 The directive was interpreted by the CJEU to allow only national or collective
bargaining agreements, “universally applicable,” rather than local ones to apply to posted
workers. So labor protections that are not universal, and that do not apply on the entire national
territory, were not considered valid by the Court.104
In Rüffert, the Bundesland of Lower Saxony awarded a German contractor who
employed a subcontractor established in Poland a public procurement contract to build the
Göttingen-Rosdorf prison. The German company signed a contract for an amount of over eight
million Euros that included certain provisions for the protection of workers deployed in public
contracting tenders. These provisions required that the contractor and its subcontractors would
commit to pay workers the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in the place
where the obligation was performed. Moreover, these provisions entitled Lower Saxony to
impose a penalty or terminate the contract in case local labour standards were not respected. 105
When the Land found that the contractor had employed a subcontractor who had hired fifty-three
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Polish workers at about half of the minimum wage established by the local collective agreement,
it issued a penalty notice of approximately 85,000 Euros and terminated the contract.106
The question before the CJEU was whether Lower Saxony’s higher standards for the
protection of workers in public procurement contracts were consistent with the Treaty’s free
movement of services and the derogations of the Posted Workers directive.107 The Courts held, in
sharp opposition to the opinion of Advocate General Bot that Lower Saxony’s
Landesvergabegesetz did not comply with the Posted Workers directive.108 The Court rejected a
public policy argument made by the German government arguing that the restriction promoted
by the Lower Saxony law was justified by the “objective of ensuring protection for independence
in the organization of working life by trade unions.”109 Then it rejected, for lack of evidence, a
national welfare argument that the provisions of Lower Saxony aimed at “ensuring the financial
balance of the social security systems [that…] depends on the level of workers’ salaries.”110
These provisions only covered public and not private contracts and the minimum wage
protections were geographically limited to the territory of Lower Saxony, rather than being
universally applicable to the entire German territory. Therefore the Court held that the
restrictions could not fall under the exception of directive 96/72.111 The Rüffert court ruled in
favor of free movements of services of the Polish construction workers posted in Germany at the
expense of the local collective agreement on public procurement.112
The horizontal dimension of the conflict in Rüffert shows Lower Saxony had higher
labour standards in public procurement contracts than other Länder. The goal of Lower Saxony’s
legislation was to provide minimum wage protections for employees in public procurement
contracts over 10,000 euros. This law served as a model to mobilize other Länder as well as the
federal government to adopt a nation-wide bill imposing higher employment standards
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throughout Germany.113 The conflict among the Länder on labour standards in public
procurement contracts went back to the late 1990s and lasted until 2000. At this time the
conservative party took power and only six Länder out of sixteen were able to adopt higher
labour standards in public procurement contracts creating what Florian Rödl called a “legislative
patchwork” in German minimum wage law. 114
If we apply the story of the three children and a flute to Rüffert, the libertarian Carla who
made the flute is represented by the Polish workers who want to be able to dump their labor to be
employed in the center and leave the periphery.115 The egalitarian Bob is Lower Saxony with
welfare legislation protecting the workers’ minimum wages. The utilitarian Anne is represented
by German business as well as other Länder taking advantage of the free movement of services
at cheaper cost.
Once again each actor in the conflict has a strong justification for obtaining the flute.
Each of their justification is relevant even though, as Damjan Kukovec cautions us, who is the
“weaker party” in this story might change according to the center-periphery power
relationship.116 While the Rüffert judgment reconciles the utilitarian positions of German
business and those Länder against the minimum wage legislation with the libertarian position of
the Polish workers, my point is that the Court does not engage with other distributive
implications such as social dumping feared by the egalitarian Bob and the change in the power
dynamics influencing the negotiation among the Länder and the German government.117
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Conclusion
The focus on conceptions of justice from below is on the plurality of interests at stake,
both vertical and horizontal ones, and their economic development implications when conflicts
arise in European law and policy. The chapter reveals the absence of a process and a normative
commitment to deploy a criterion of distributive justice to drive cohesion policies and interpret
European law. Instead of grasping the complexity of local and horizontal interests at stake that
could have entered in the Court’s proportionality analysis, or in the articulation of an economic
development strategy in cohesion policy, lawyers, judges and policy makers in Europe appear
more concerned with institutional demands of justice rather its social realization. In the attempt
to shift this perspective, looking at the lens through the conceptions of justice from below sheds
light on the imperfect relation between increasing regional disparities and social and economic
inequalities on the one hand, and our different capabilities for individual enjoyment on the other.
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